CEOs INSIDERS E AS PRÁTICAS DE GERENCIAMENTO DE RESULTADOS EM COMPANHIAS ABERTAS LISTADAS NA [B]3

Autores

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.14392/asaa.2020130302

Palavras-chave:

Características dos CEOs, Recrutamento dos CEOs, Qualidade da informação contábil.

Resumo

O objetivo do estudo é analisar se as características dos CEOs insiders influenciam nas práticas de gerenciamento de resultados das companhias de capital aberto listadas na [B]3. A amostra foi composta por 192 empresas não financeiras, totalizando 2.112 observações no período 2008-2018. Para analisar os resultados utilizou-se a técnica de regressão linear múltipla. A contribuição do estudo recai na clara identificação de que no trade-off entre escolhas contábeis ou decisões operacionais, os CEOs insiders preferem utilizar os accruals discricionários para gerenciamento dos resultados. Em termos práticos, os resultados indicam que a preocupação dos insiders é com a manutenção dos resultados no longo prazo, tendo em vista que a opção por decisões operacionais pode prejudicar a perpetuidade da empresa, com cortes em despesas prioritárias e na produção acima da demanda. A contribuição teórica do estudo está em evidenciar que nos primeiros anos de mandato, os CEOs insiders são mais propensos a praticar gerenciamento de resultados pelas duas opções, enquanto no longo mandato se tornam mais conservadores, abandonando ambas as práticas. O estudo também permitiu demonstrar que os CEOs insiders com formação em contabilidade têm preferência pela manipulação de resultados mediante decisões operacionais, enquanto para os CEOs insiders mais velhos as evidências foram mistas e com coeficientes de baixo resultado econômico.

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Biografia do Autor

Francielle Corazza, Universidade Comunitária da Região de Capecó - UNOCHAPECO

Mestranda pelo Programa de Pós Graduação em Ciências Contábeis e Administração pela UNOHCAPECO.

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Publicado

19/12/2020

Como Citar

Corazza, F., Dal Magro, C. B., Mazzioni, S., & Klann, R. C. (2020). CEOs INSIDERS E AS PRÁTICAS DE GERENCIAMENTO DE RESULTADOS EM COMPANHIAS ABERTAS LISTADAS NA [B]3. Advances in Scientific and Applied Accounting, 1(1), 023–040. https://doi.org/10.14392/asaa.2020130302

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