FEDERALISMO FISCAL E AS TRANSFERÊNCIAS INTERGOVERNAMENTAIS: UM ESTUDO EXPLORATÓRIO COM OS MUNICÍPIOS BRASILEIROS
Keywords:
Transferências Intergovernamentais. Federalismo Fiscal. Descentralização.Abstract
Na estrutura federalista fiscal brasileira, as transferências intergovernamentais surgem como uma forma de correção/amenização dos desequilíbrios entre os entes subnacionais. Todavia, as transferências podem funcionar como um estímulo para a acomodação de certos entes federados ou como um convite ao desperdício de recursos. A literatura sobre federalismo fiscal destaca que a descentralização permitiria que os governos subnacionais fossem mais eficientes em fornecer bens públicos caracterizados por demandas locais e para os quais as economias de escala fossem irrelevantes. Nesse contexto, objetiva-se identificar se as transferências têm sido capazes de melhorar a eficiência na alocação dos recursos públicos nos municípios brasileiros. Foram empregados a análise de conglomerados hierárquica e teste de igualdade de médias. Os resultados apontaram que a maioria dos municípios brasileiros (4.911) possui uma receita própria inferior a 10,5% da receita total. Da mesma forma, 4.203 municípios apresentaram uma relação entre as transferências recebidas e a receita total superior a 85,3%, em média. Ficou evidente, também, que no caso brasileiro, as transferências têm exercido dois papeis marcantes: ao mesmo tempo que fornece baixo incentivo para que os entes subnacionais aumentem a sua arrecadação, há evidências de que as transferências têm estimulado o desenvolvimento de regiões menos favorecidas.Downloads
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